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CASE COMMENTARY
DOES AN ILLINOIS ENTREPRENEUR HAVE A
DUTY TO PROVIDE A REASONABLY SAFE MEANS OF
INGRESS AND EGRESS TO ITS BUSINESS PREMISES
OR HAS THIS WELL-ESTABLISHED RULE OF
LAW BECOME A MERE EXCEPTION?
Robert S. Minetz*
INTRODUCTION
Until the decisions in Seipp v. Chicago Transit Authority' and Decker v.
Polk Brothers,2 it was well-established by Illinois appellate courts 3 that
entrepreneurs had a duty to provide their customers with safe means of
ingress and egress to their business premises. Accordingly, entrepreneurs
were held liable to their patrons who were injured on adjoining parcels of
property even though the operator of the business did not own or lease the
property at the precise point of the injury.4 This established rule of law5
* Attorney, Malato & Stein, P.C., Chicago, Illinois; B.A., DePaul University; J.D., Uni-
versity of Illinois.
1. 12 Ill. App. 3d 852, 299 N.E.2d 330 (1st Dist. 1973). For a discussion of the Seipp case,
see notes 40-44 and accompanying text infra.
2. 43 111. App. 3d 563, 357 N.E.2d 599 (1st Dist. 1976). For a discussion of the Decker case,
see notes 45-49 and accompanying text infra.
3. See Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lanes, Inc., 5 111. 2d 153, 125 N.E.2d 47 (1955); McDonald v.
Frontier Lanes, Inc., 1 111. App. 3d 345, 272 N.E.2d 369 (2d Dist. 1971); Jones v. Granite City
Steel Co., 104 111. App. 2d 379, 244 N.E.2d 427 (5th Dist. 1969); Cooley v. Makse, 46 Ill. App.
2d 25, 196 N.E.2d 396 (2d Dist. 1964); Stedman v. Spiros, 23 Ill. App. 2d 69, 161 N.E.2d 590
(2d Dist. 1959); Thomas v. Douglas, 1 111. App. 2d 261, 117 N.E.2d 417 (1st Dist. 1954);
Steinberg v. Northern Ill. Tel. Co., 260 Ill. App. 538 (2d Dist. 1931); Mauzy v. Kinzel, 19 Ill.
App. 571 (1st Dist. 1886). See also Donovan v. Raschke, 106 Ill. App. 2d 366, 246 N.E.2d 110
(1st Dist. 1969) (business property owner abutting public sidewalk owes duty of care to noninvi-
tees using sidewalk if business owner has used sidewalk for his own purposes); King v. Swanson,
216 Ill. App. 294 (1st Dist. 1919) (same).
4. According to Prosser, the area where a business invitee may reasonably expect safe
conditions "extends to the entrance to the property, and to a safe exit after the business is
concluded." W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs §78, at 391 (4th ed. 1971) (citations
omitted).
5. According to the United States Supreme Court:
[T]he rule-founded in justice and necessity, and illustrated in many adjudged cases
in the American courts [is] that the owner or occupant of land who, by invitation,
express or implied, induces or leads others to come upon his premises, for any lawful
purpose, is liable in damages to such persons . . . for injuries occasioned by the
unsafe condition of the land or its approaches, if such condition was known to him
and not to them, and was negligently suffered to exist, without timely notice to the
public, or to those who were likely to act upon such invitation.
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was premised upon the recognition that merchants must entice customers
onto their business property and customers must depend upon merchants to
provide safe means of access and exit. Therefore, courts found it fair to hold
business owners liable if they engendered reliance by their patrons and
subsequently failed to provide appropriate access and exit facilities.
In recent years, however, some Illinois courts have begun to label the duty
to provide a safe means of ingress and egress to businesses over adjoining
property an exception rather than a general rule of tort liability. The sugges-
tions made by the Seipp court and the decision rendered by the Decker court,
both of which limit the patron's right to recover, have recently been accepted
and extended by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in Strauch v. United States.' This trend deserves critical examination to
determine whether a fundamentally sound rule of law is becoming a mere
exception.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW
Prior to recent appellate court decisions, Illinois had long been among the
jurisdictions7 that recognize the doctrine of "off-premises" liability and im-
pose liability on businesses for injuries sustained by their patrons even if the
injuries did not occur within the technical lot lines of the business' property.
The decision in Mauzy v. Kinzel8 provides an early example of this tort
doctrine. In Mauzy, the plaintiff was a hotel patron who left his room one
night to "answer a call of nature."9 He wandered down a hall that was not
under the hotel's control and fell down an elevator shaft he mistook for a
Bennett v. Railroad Co., 102 U.S. 577, 580 (1880). In Bennett, plaintiff, in order to reach his
destination, was forced to traverse "a plank-way ... extending from Danville along a side-track
of the railroad, and terminating at or near the northern end of the depot; thence up a flight of
stairs to the depot floor, and across the floor of the depot towards its southern end; thence down
a flight of steps, located between two of the hatch-holes, to the wharf-boat, over a macadamized
or gravel way." Id. at 579. While crossing the depot floor towards its southern end at night in
total darkness, plaintiff fell through one of the hatch-holes in the floor, thereby severely injuring
himself. Id. at 579-80. The court cited several English cases in which defendant merchants were
held liable for injuries incurred on unsafe approaches to land, id. at 581-84, and concluded that
defendant railroad company breached its duty to maintain the passageway in a reasonably safe
condition. Id. at 586.
6. 637 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the Strauch case, see notes 50-56 and
accompanying text infra.
7. See Bennett v. Railroad Co., 102 U.S. 577 (1880); Blaine v. United States, 102 F. Supp.
161 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Sexton v. Brooks, 39 Cal. 2d 153, 245 P.2d 496 (1952); Viands v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 107 A.2d 118 (D.C. 1954); Shields v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., 106 So. 2d
90 (Fla. 1958); Scroggins v. Campbellton Plaza Corp., 113 Ga. App. 23, 150 S.E.2d 179 (1966);
Perl v. Cuhudas, Peterson, Paoli, Nast. Co., 295 Mich. 325, 294 N.W. 697 (1940); Evans v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 104 S.W.2d 1035 (Mo. 1937); Chapman v. Parking, Inc., 329 S.W.2d
439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Rockefeller v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 11 Wash. App. 520, 523
P.2d 1207 (1974); Werner v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc., 8 Wis. 2d 491, 100 N.W.2d 920 (1960).
8. 19 I11. App. 571 (1st Dist. 1886).
9. Id. at 571.
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door. Mauzy subsequently sued the hotel to recover damages for his injuries.
The defendant hotel operator argued that there could be no liability because
he did not have control over the elevator or the passage immediately adja-
cent to the elevator. 10 The appellate court rejected this argument and held
the defendant liable even though he did not have control over the precise
place of the plaintiff's fall." The court held that the defendant owed a duty
to his patrons to maintain not only the property owned by him, but also the
area where his patrons might reasonably travel. The Mauzy holding in 1886
was representative of Illinois law for many years.
The Mauzy doctrine was reaffirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Second District in Steinberg v. Northern Illinois Telephone Co., 12 decided in
1931. In Steinberg, the plaintiff was injured while traversing an enclosed
stairway that was the sole means of access to the defendant's place of busi-
ness. The defendant claimed that it did not lease or control the property at
the place of the fall and, therefore, was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries.
The appellate court rejected the defendant's contention, stating that it was
not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the defendant was "the owner,
lessee, or even in control of the hall and stairway."' 3 Noting that the only
means of access to defendant's telephone exchange was the stairway where
the plaintiff fell, the court decided that it was immaterial whether the
defendant had any control over the property.14
According to the Steinberg court: "[a]n owner or occupier of land who, by
invitation, express or implied, induces or leads others to go upon premises for
any lawful purpose is liable for injuries occasioned by his negligent failure to
keep the land or its approaches in a reasonably safe condition."' 15 The court,
stating the policy basis for its decision, reasoned:
No sound reason can be advanced why a person should be excused
from liability for injuries when he knowingly permits or invites his
patrons to use an unsafe means of ingress and egress to and from his
office. If he knows the means are unsafe or has good reason for
knowing it, he should not invite his patrons to use them. If he is
negligent in that regard and injury results, he has no cause to
complain if he is asked to respond in damages.1"
This quote succinctly stated the law on the issue of off-premises liability in
1931.
The 1954 decision in Thomas v. Douglas17 is also consistent with the
earlier opinions in Mauzy and Steinberg. In Thomas, the plaintiff, defend-
10. Id. at 572.
11. Id. at 573.
12. 260 IM. App. 538 (2d Dist. 1931).
13. Id. at 540-41.
14. Id. at 541.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 542.
17. 1 111. App. 2d 261, 117 N.E.2d 417 (1st Dist. 1954).
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ant's tenant, incurred injuries when she fell "into a window well on defend-
ant's premises while walking upon a private passageway located on land
adjoining defendant's premises and adjacent to the window well."' 8  The
jury found for the plaintiff and awarded damages. On appeal, the defendant
argued that he owed no duty to the plaintiff because she failed to prove his
ownership of the passageway. 9 Moreover, the defendant claimed that the
plaintiff's cause of action was barred because she was a trespasser upon a
private passageway when she was injured. 20  The appellate court rejected
both of these arguments, reasoning that the evidence showed that tenants
had used the passageway for several years and that the unguarded window
well constituted a dangerous condition. The Thomas court, therefore, held
that the defendant was responsible and that his lack of ownership was
immaterial. 2' The holding in Thomas provides another example of the
perpetuation of off-premises liability by an Illinois court.
Ten years after the Thomas decision, an Illinois appellate court was again
confronted with the issue of whether the lessor and lessee of a tavern were
liable for an injury sustained by a patron who fell over some loose bricks on a
walkway leading to a tavern entrance. In Cooley v. Makse, 22 the munici-
pally-owned walkway on which the injury occurred was adjacent to a tav-
ern. 23 The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the tavern owner and the
plaintiff appealed.
The Cooley court first examined Stedman v. Spiros, 24 an Illinois case in
which the defendant hotel owner was absolved from fault for injuries suf-
fered by a guest who had fallen "some 15 feet away from the sidewalk
[adjacent to the lodge] and some 50 feet from the lodge."25 The Stedman
court surmised that the outcome of the case might have been different had
18. Id. at 263, 117 N.E.2d at 417.
19. Id. at 267, 117 N.E.2d at 419.
20. Id. The general rule is-that landowners are not liable for injuries suffered on their land
by trespassers absent knowledge by the landowner that trespassers frequently traverse his land.
W. PaossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS §58 (4th ed. 1971).
21. 1 111. App. 2d at 267, 117 N.E.2d at 419.
22. 46 111. App. 2d 25, 196 N.E.2d 396 (2d Dist. 1964). Halloran v. Belt Ry., 25 Ill. App. 2d
114, 166 N.E.2d 98 (1st Dist. 1960), also held that there is no magic to lot lines and that liability
will be extended beyond lot lines in proper circumstances; however, the Halloran decision
presents a different factual problem. In Halloran, the appellate court considerd the liability of a
landowner to children who played on a sand pile on the defendant's property. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant because the injured child was hurt thirty feet from
the sand pile. The appellate court reversed the trial court even though the defendant did "not
own or control the premises on which plaintiff was injured." Id. at 119, 166 N.E.2d at 101. The
basis of the court's decision was the defendant's knowledge of the children's play habits and its
knowledge of the dangers inherent in the route to and from the sand pile. Thus, the Halloran
court properly held that the defendant had a duty to use due care for the safety of the children
traveling to and from its property if the children "were exposed to dangers in the immediate
approach to its premises." Id.
23. 46 I11. App. 2d at 26, 196 N.E.2d at 396.
24. 23 Ill. App. 2d 69, 161 N.E.2d 590 (2d Dist. 1959).
25. 46 Ill. App. 2d at 28, 196 N.E.2d at 397.
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the plaintiff injured himself closer to the defendant's premises. 26  According
to the court in Cooley, "[t]his [conclusion] was made arguendo rather than
decidendo. Nevertheless, it does impel us to pause and take a closer look. 2
The court then examined the decision in Viands v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,26 a
case in which the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held the defendant merchant liable for the injuries incurred by a customer
who fell when leaving the merchant's grocery store.2 1 While the plaintiff in
Viands had one foot in the store at the time of the fall and, thus, was at least
partially on the defendant's premises, the Cooley court viewed the Viands
holding as extending beyond the situation in which "the mere presence of a
foot. . . on the property of the defendant imposes a liability where the causa
de injuria and the injury occurred on the public sidewalk." 30
Having recognized a duty on the part of entrepreneurs to maintain adjoin-
ing property if used as a means of ingress or egress, the court in Cooley
refused to distinguish between the liability of the lessor and lessee of the
tavern. The court held that both parties knew or should have known of the
defective condition of the walk and, therefore, both should face the conse-
quences .3  Finally, the appellate court rejected the time-worn contention
that imposition of liability against nonowners would open the "floodgates to
litigation," and dismissed the argument that the municipality alone had the
duty to repair.3 2 The court downplayed the likelihood that liability would
be extended to cover plaintiffs located great distances from the defendant's
property, thereby causing "catastrophic results, ' 33 and noted that plaintiffs
in these cases would be considered invitees as opposed to members of the
general public. Moreover, the court stated that, while the city may have had
a duty to repair the sidewalk, the defendants also had the duty to protect
their customers through "adequate illumination, proper warning or other-
wise. "34
26. 23 Ill. App. 2d at 83, 161 N.E.2d at 597. Although the decision in Stedman held against
the invitee, the opinion recognized that there is a duty imposed on Illinois businesses "to exercise
reasonable care to keep in a safe condition those portions of the premises included within the
invitation to the invitee, including reasonably safe means of ingress and egress, even where the
mode chosen is not the customary one but one which is allowed by the owner." Id. Nevertheless,
the court in Stedman held that the plaintiff who was injured near the defendant's concessions in
a 700 acre state park was not entitled to recover because the defendant could not be responsible
for the vast area that was not within the leasehold. Accordingly, the court refused to extend the
decision in Mauzy to the facts of Stedman.
27. 46 Ill. App. 2d at 29, 196 N.E.2d at 398.
28. 107 A.2d 118 (D.C. 1954).
29. In Viands, the defendant was aware that neighborhood boys often lined up with wagons
outside his store in order to assist shoppers carry away their packages. The plaintiff was injured
when she tripped over one of these wagons. Id. at 119.
30. 46 I11. App. 2d at 30, 196 N.E.2d at 398.
31. Id. at 31, 196 N.E.2d at 398. The court determined that the walk was in a state of
disrepair when the lease was signed and that both the landlord and tenant acknowledged the
necessary use of the walk by business invitees. Id.





The most recent Illinois decision to impose liability on an entrepreneur for
an off-premises injury is McDonald v. Frontier Lanes, Inc. 35  The
McDonald case involved an injury sustained by a person who "stepped into a
hole in a parkway owned by the City of Elgin located across a public
sidewalk from the parking lot maintained by Frontier for its tavern and
bowling patrons.- 36  The plaintiff had parked her car on a public way and
walked to the defendant's tavern. After consuming a few drinks, she left the
defendant's premises to return to her car and, subsequently, fell into a hole in
the parkway. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict against
Frontier. "
Frontier contended that its duty to provide safe access was limited to the
premises that it owned and controlled. The Illinois appellate court flatly
rejected this argument in favor of the general rule that the merchant owes a
"duty to provide an invitee with reasonably safe means of ingress and egress
both within the confines of the premises owned or controlled by the inviter
and, within the limitations dictated by the facts of the case, beyond the
precise boundaries of such premises." 38 In so holding, the court relied on the
decisions rendered in Stedman, Thomas, Steinberg, and Mauzy. The court
affirmed the jury verdict against Frontier and noted that the evidence sup-
ported the jury's determination that the defendant Frontier had assumed the
use and control over the area where the injury occurred and that Frontier
had breached its duty to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous condition. 39
Thus, a clear line of precedent gradually had developed by the early 1970's
holding that business owners in Illinois owed a duty to their patrons to
35. 1 11. App. 3d 345, 272 N.E.2d 369 (2d Dist. 1971). Accord, Smith v. Rengel, 97 I11. App.
3d 204, 422 N.E.2d 1146 (4th Dist. 1981). The appellate court in Smith relied on McDonald in
imposing a duty on a landlord to provide a safe means of ingress and egress, however, the
premises in question were not business premises. Thus, the Smith reasoning can be easily
distinguished from the cases in which a duty is imposed on a business owner.
For a discussion of the McDonald opinion, see Turkington, Torts, 1972 Survey of Illinois
Law, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 29, 33-35 (1972).
36. 1 111. App. 3d at 348, 272 N.E.2d at 371. The parkway in which the hole was located
had been planted with small trees and dedicated to and accepted by the city two years before the
accident. Id. at 348-49, 272 N.E.2d at 371.
37. Id. at 348, 272 N.E.2d at 370. The president of Frontier Lanes, Inc. and Northern
Illinois Gas Company were also named as defendants. The Northern Illinois Gas Company was
named because the hole was caused by settling in the ground following installation of gas pipe to
heat the tavern and bowling alley. A three-inch depression in the parkway existed after the pipe
was installed and the trench filled, and testimony was heard at the trial that at least a foot of
additional settling could be expected. Id. at 349, 272 N.E.2d at 372. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's denial of Northern Illinois Gas Company's motions for a directed
verdict or judgment n.o.v. Id. at 356, 272 N.E.2d at 377. Further, the court found the president
of Frontier Lanes, Inc., Tony Ceresa, personally liable for the negligence of the corporate
defendant and remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to enter a judgment n.o.v.
against Ceresa. Id. at 358, 272 N.E.2d at 377-78.
38. Id. at 351, 272 N.E.2d at 372.
39. Id. at 352-53, 272 N.E.2d at 374.
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provide safe access and exit facilities to and from their businesses. Moreover,
the majority of these cases adopted a standard of reasonableness to determine
the entrepreneur's liability in each situation.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCEPTION
The 1973 opinion of the appellate court in Seipp v. Chicago Transit
Authority4 set the tone for the recent trend of Illinois decisions refusing to
hold businesses responsible for injuries suffered by their invitees on adjoining
premises. In Seipp, the plaintiff was injured while walking on a dirt path
used by the plaintiff and other Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) riders as a
means of ingress and egress to a train station. The CTA had provided a
different path along its property for use by its passengers, but Mrs. Seipp
chose the "shortcut" on the day of her injury. 41
The Seipp opinion is reconcilable with other decisions in this area of tort
law because the court did not seek to establish a new rule of law. Citing
McDonald, the court restated the principle that there is "a duty to provide an
invitee with a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress, both within the
confines of the premises owned or controlled by the inviter, and, within
limitations dictated by the facts of the case, beyond the precise boundaries of
such premises." 42 The court held, however, that the CTA fulfilled this duty
by providing its passengers with a paved and illuminated path. In essence,
the court held that the CTA was free from any negligence as a matter-of law.
This ruling, then, is consistent with other decisions which have held that a
person who elects to take an unsafe route and disregards a safer route cannot
recover for injuries sustained on the former path. 43
Although the Seipp holding is consistent with other decisions, the court's
reasoning is problematic. After analyzing the McDonald and Cooley deci-
sions, the Seipp court stated that it found "no evidence that the CTA either
prescribed the dirt path to its patrons as a means of egress or ingress or
assumed its use as such at the time of the accident. '44 This statement could
be interpreted to mean that a plaintiff must prove either "prescription" or
"assumption" to be successful in an off-premises case. If the Seipp opinion is
read to require evidence of prescription or assumption, a drastic change in
the law of off-premises tort liability would result. It is erroneous, however,
40. 12 111. App. 3d 852, 299 N.E.2d 330 (lst Dist. 1973).
41. Id. at 854-56, 299 N.E.2d at 332.
42. Id. at 858, 299 N.E.2d at 334.
43. See, e.g., Shannon v. Addison Trail High School, 33 Ill. App. 3d 953, 339 N.E.2d 372
(2d Dist. 1975) (defendant not held liable for plaintiff's injuries where plaintiff, faced with two
routes, chose shortest but most dangerous); Harris v. Union Stock Yards, 29 Ill. App. 3d 1072,
331 N.E.2d 182 (1st Dist. 1975) (defendant not held liable for plaintiff's injuries where plaintiff
took shortest, but not safest or only available, path). See also Connolly v. Melroy, 63 Ill. App. 3d
850, 380 N.E.2d 863 (1st Dist. 1978) (plaintiff may be contributorily negligent if he has two
alternative ways to perform a task and chooses the one most likely to produce hazardous results).
44. 12 11. App. 3d at 859, 299 N.E.2d at 335.
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for any court to require this strict burden. Instead, the general duty imposed
on business owners and the accepted doctrines of negligence, comparative
fault, and proximate cause are sufficient to ensure that liability is not im-
posed arbitrarily.
The trend started by the holding in Seipp was subsequently expanded by
the decision in Decker v. Polk Brothers.45 The Decker opinion represents the
most direct conflict with the earlier Illinois cases and, therefore, merits
careful analysis to determine the status of off-premises liability. The defend-
ant business owner in Decker owned two stores on Central Avenue in Chi-
cago (2850 and 2910). On the morning of the occurrence, the plaintiff
parked her car on Central Avenue approximately ten feet north of the 2910
store. 46 Later in the day, having concluded her shopping at the defendant's
stores, she headed north on Central Avenue toward her automobile and
twisted her ankle on a depression in the sidewalk several feet from the north
door of the 2910 store. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
but the court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment n.o.v. because
the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant had any legal duty either to
repair the walk or to warn the plaintiff of any defect in the walk. The trial
court based its decision on the fact that the sidewalk was neither owned nor
controlled by the defendant. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
ruling.47
The Decker court recognized that "an owner or occupier of premises has a
duty to provide a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress both on his
premises and 'within the limitations dictated by the facts of the case, beyond
the precise boundaries of such premises.' "48 Nevertheless, the court stated
that this general rule is inapplicable to injuries incurred on public sidewalks.
This reasoning is curious because the court noted that the Cooley and
McDonald cases involved public walks. 49
45. 43 I11. App. 3d 563, 357 N.E.2d 599 (1st Dist. 1976).
46. Id. at 564, 357 N.E.2d at 600.
47. Id. at 566, 357 N.E.2d at 601.
48. Id. at 565, 357 N.E.2d at 600.
49. The court cited Burns v. Kunz, 290 Ill. App. 278, 8 N.E.2d 360 (1st Dist. 1937), to
support the proposition that landowners have generally not been held liable for injuries incurred
on municipally-controlled public sidewalks. 43 Ill. App. 3d at 565, 357 N.E.2d at 600. The
defendant property owners in Burns, however, were not entrepreneurs. Neither were the de-
fendant business owners in the cases cited by the Burns court as precedent. See City of Chicago
v. Crosby, 111 I11. 538 (1884); City of Chicago v. O'Brien, 111 I11. 532 (1884); Gridley v. City of
Bloomington, 88 I11. 554 (1878); City of Bloomington v. Bay, 42 I11. 503 (1867). According to the
court in Gridley:
[D]efendant has no other interest in the street in front of his property than any other
citizen of the municipality. The same is true of the sidewalk. It is part of the street
set apart for the exclusive use of persons traveling on foot, and is as much under the
control of the municipal government as the street itself ...
88 Ill. at 556. Significantly, the Gridley opinion includes no mention of business invitees or
patrons and no discussion of access and exit facilities.
[Vol. 30:403
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The holding in Decker created a clear conflict among Illinois appellate
courts on the issue of off-premises liability. This conflict should be resolved in
favor of imposing liability in these situations and the Decker rationale should
be disregarded. The most compelling reason to disregard the Decker decision
is because it is irreconcilable with numerous earlier Illinois decisions. Al-
though the Decker court recognized the validity of Cooley v. Makse and
McDonald v. Frontier Lanes, Inc., the court's attempt to distinguish these
decisions should not be deemed persuasive. Finally, the failure of the Decker
court to explain its reasoning substantially weakens the precedential value of
this decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit most recently
considered the issue of off-premises liability in 1980 in Strauch v. United
States.50 The primary issue in Strauch was whether the federal government
was entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff was injured on a
sidewalk owned by the City of Chicago, but located near a United States
Post Office. The plaintiff, after parking her car in a postal parking lot,
proceeded from the lot to the post office building via the city sidewalk. This
section of sidewalk between the exit from the parking lot and the entrance to
the office was the only route available to patrons who parked their cars in the
lot. After using the postal facilities to mail a letter and purchase a money
order, the plaintiff returned to her car via the same route and tripped over
some allegedly uneven sidewalk tiles. The point of the plaintiff's fall was
approximately one foot west of the fence that bordered the parking lot and
nine feet from the northwest corner of the postal office. These facts presented
a classic setting for the imposition of off-premises liability, however, the
district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 5'
In essence, the Seventh Circuit adopted a balancing test to determine if the
facts more closely resembled Decker or Cooley and McDonald. The court
reasoned that Decker was consistent with the "general rule" that an abutting
landowner is not liable to members of the public for injuries caused by
failure to maintain a sidewalk.5 2 Accordingly, Cooley and McDonald were
characterized as exceptions due to distinguishable facts. 53 McDonald was
distinguished on the basis that the defendant in that case had assumed
control of the walkway through his actions. 54 Similarly, Cooley was differ-
entiated because the defendant had not "appropriated" the walkway
through exclusive use. 55 The Strauch court reasoned that there was "signifi-
50. 637 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1980).
51. Id. at 478.
52. Id. at 479.
53. Id. at 479-80.
54. Id. at 480. The Seventh Circuit deferred to the district court's finding that the defendant
in McDonald "appropriated the use of the public way by allowing customers to impede the
pedestrian use of the walk by the parking of autos." Id.
55. Id. The court cited the determination of the Cooley court that the sidewalk in that case
was not only the sole means of access to the tavern but that it was used soley by defendant's
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cantly more control over the walkway" by the defendants in Cooley and
McDonald than was exercised by the United States in Strauch.56
In applying Decker, the Strauch court refused to recognize the validity of
Cooley or McDonald and stated that they were merely exceptions to the
general rule due to their unusual facts. This conclusion is incorrect. For more
than eight decades, the general rule in Illinois has been that business invitees
are entitled to damages when negligently injured on an access or exit route
from a defendant's business. Accordingly, the Decker case is the exception,
not the applicable rule of law.
CONCLUSION
For nearly a century, Illinois appellate courts have adhered to the rule that
entrepreneurs owe their customers a duty to provide safe means of ingress
and egress to and from their businesses. The extent of the business owner's
duty in a particular case may depend on the accepted practice of his patrons
or on the amount of control exercised by him over the area in question. It is
clear, however, that the duty of the entrepreneur extends beyond the bound-
aries of his lot lines, even to public sidewalks.
In recent years, the Illinois courts have reconsidered the general rule of
law which imposes a duty on entrepreneurs to provide their customers with a
safe means of ingress and egress. In limiting the extent of an entrepreneur's
liability and duty, the Seipp, Decker, and Strauch courts have implied that it
is unfair to impose liability on businesses for off-premises injuries. This
analysis is unsound.
The premise of the implied unfairness is the business owner's lack of
control over the property at the precise point of the injury in off-premises
liability cases. While this may be a relevant concern in determining liability,
it should not affect the duty imposed on entrepreneurs. Instead, the courts
should realize that any problem with the entrepreneur's relationship to the
property on which the injury occurred is material only to the determination
of negligence and not to the issue of duty. Further, since the requirements of
proof in a negligence action adequately protect business owners from an
unfair imposition of liability, no good reason exists to tamper with the
accepted principle that Illinois entrepreneurs owe their patrons a reasonably
safe means of ingress and egress to their businesses, extending a reasonable
distance over adjoining properties. A contrary result rewards negligent busi-
ness owners and prejudices the rights of injured persons.
patrons as well. The Seventh Circuit, thus, concluded that the sidewalk in that case was
factually much different from the one in Strauch. Id.
56. Id. at 479. The Strauch court did not equate control by the defendant with the fact that
the sidewalk was the only available path between the parking lot and the post office. "The mere
fact that postal patrons must foreseeably use the sidewalk does not represent sufficient control by
the postal station" to hold the United States liable for plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 480.
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